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ABSTRACT
In the Middle East, water is becoming a far more valuable natural resource than
oil. Access to water has domestic and regional economic, political, and security
implications for the Middle East. Water is likely to be the issue that sparks the next
conflict in the Middle East. This thesis describes the impact of rapid population growth
and urbanization, industrialization and pollution, and "self-sufficiency" agricultural
policies on the water resources of the Middle East. Current capacities of water renewal
and water production are not likely to be capable of supporting the future growth of the
Middle East without intense planning and management. Five regions of the Middle East
are currently feeling the effects of water scarcity: the Arabian Peninsula, the Euphrates-
Tigris Basin, the Jordan Basin, the Maghreb, and the Nile Basin. Information is also
provided about the Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia. Various schemes to
obtain additional water resources are explored including Turkey's proposed "Peace
Pipeline," which could supply water from Turkey to the countries of the Levant and the
Arabian Peninsula. "Virtual Water" also is explored as a source of water for the Middle
East.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the Middle East, water is becoming a more valuable resource than oil. Access
to fresh water has strategic security implications for the states of the region. Water
scarcity is likely to be the spark that ignites the next conflict in the Middle East.
Various factors push water scarcity into the crisis arena. Among these factors are
rapid population growth and urbanization, industrialization and pollution, and agricultural
policy. Current capacities of water use have placed strains on renewable supplies of
water. This situation will only become worse in the future.
Five regions, largely centered on river basins, are explored in this thesis. The
Arabian Peninsula is explored in more detail than the other regions, with Saudi Arabia
being of particular interest. The other regions explored are the Euphrates-Tigris Basin,
the Jordan Basin, the Maghreb, and the Nile Basin.
Various schemes are in use or are proposed to resolve the water crisis.
Desalination is the most heavily used method. Other schemes are the Med-Dead and
Red-Dead canal systems. There are even plans involving the use of sea-going tankers to
deliver water from water-rich countries to water-poor countries. Turkey has proposed a
water "peace pipeline" which would deliver water from the Ceyhan and Seyhan Rivers in
southern Turkey to the water-poor states in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. A very
interesting proposal surrounds the use of "virtual water," the creation of additional water
resources for other uses by altering water usage and management policies.
The thesis concludes with a summary of the water crisis in the Middle East and
some recommendations to resolve the water crisis and potential future conflict over
access to water.
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In the Middle East, water is becoming a more valuable resource than oil. Access
to fresh water has economic, political, and security implications. Water scarcity is likely
to be the spark that ignites the next conflict in the Middle East. Current capacities of
water use are straining renewable supplies of water. This situation will only become
worse in the future. The following factors together contribute negatively to water
scarcity: rapid population growth; urbanization; pollution; industrialization; and
agricultural policy.
There are various methods and proposals to increase water supplies in the Middle
East. Desalination is currently the primary means of increasing supplies of water. Israel
and Jordan have proposed the Mediterranean-Dead Sea and Red-Dead Sea canal systems.
Another proposal is the use of sea-going tankers to provide water to thirsty countries.
Turkey has proposed a water "peace pipeline" which would supply water from the
Ceyhan and Seyhan Rivers in southern Turkey to the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula.
This thesis evaluates the effects that the proposed water projects, such as the
peace pipeline, would have on the Middle East, particularly the Arabian Peninsula. The
costs of building these water projects will be compared with the costs of building other
means of water production, such as desalination plants, and other methods of water
transport, such as the sea-going tankers and the canal systems. "Virtual water " is
explored as another means of increasing water supply.
B. THESIS STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
Chapter II examines not only water scarcity in the Middle East, but also the
factors that exacerbate the imbalance between water use and the availability of resources.
The factors examined are: the impact of population growth and urbanization; the effects
of industrialization and economic expansion; the effects of pollution; and the impact of
agricultural policies
Chapter III provides a review of the current water situation throughout the Middle
East by briefly examining the impending water crisis in each of the following sub-
regions: the Euphrates-Tigris Basin; the Jordan Basin, the Nile Basin; and the Maghreb.
Chapter IV provides a similar study of the water situation in the Arabian
Peninsula states along the Persian Gulf. Water supply and water usage data is presented
as well as population growth statistics to explore the future of water in the following Gulf
States: Bahrain; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; and the United Arab Emirates.
Chapter V provides the same study for Saudi Arabia, including details of
numerous water projects currently conducted in the country.
Chapter VI will examine various water resource technologies including
desalinization, canal systems, the use of water bags or water tankers, and the proposed
water "peace pipeline." The costs of building the pipeline are evaluated in comparison
with costs of building other means of water production and other methods of water
transport. Also examined is the concept of "virtual water" as a means of creating water
by changing policies of water usage and cooperation in water policy between neighboring
states.
2
Chapter VII provides conclusions and recommendations regarding the impending
water crisis in the Middle East.
Appendix A provides data on the renewable fresh water resources and the usage
rate of fresh water by the Middle East.
Appendix B provides data on the desalination capacity of Middle East.
3
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II. WATER SCARCITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Already today, water rivals petroleum as the single most contested liquid
asset in the region due to a combination of growing demand, increasing
scarcity, and sources of supply that are dwindling at an alarming rate.'
In the mid-1980s, U.S. intelligence services estimated that the Middle East was
the likeliest place in the world where war could break out over the sharing of dwindling
water supplies.2 The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region represents five
percent of the world's population but contains only 0.9 percent of the world's water
resources.3 The Arabian Peninsula has the scarcest supplies of water and will soon
utilize all available fresh water resources. Appendix A shows the renewable freshwater
supplies of the eighteen MENA states discussed in this thesis as well as the freshwater
usage of the eighteen states.
Access to freshwater is one of the most important issues within the Middle East
and is likely to be the cause of future conflict. Many countries share water resources in
the form of common aquifers, which are subject to overuse or pollution. This thesis
examines the Nile Basin, Jordan Basin, the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, the Arabian
Peninsula, and North Africa. Conflict over access to fresh water is likely to occur in any
1 Aharon Klieman, "Middle Eastern Water Wars." in The World and 113, no. 12 (Dec. 1998).
Available [Online]: http:/!proquest.umi.comipdqweb ProQuest Direct/Search: "Middle East" and "Water"
[4 October 2000].
2 Joyce R. Starr, Water Wars (August 1995). Available [online] bttp:/www.ciesin.orR/docs/006-
304/006-304.btml [8 March 2001]. Originally published in Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991), 17-36.
3 The World Bank Group, From Scarcity to Security: Averting a Water Crisis in the Middle East
and North Africa, World Bank Report (1996), 6. Also available [online] http://vw,.worldbank.org/html/
extdr!offre/menaifocus/booklet.ara.html.
5
of these regions in the near future. Security of water resources and continued access to
water will soon become a military and defense mission for these countries.
The regional water crisis is not only a result of physical geography, but also of
human demographics, particularly rapid population growth. The strategic importance of
water has increased to the point that is has begun to affect relations between the countries
of the Middle East. Rapid population growth and urbanization in the region, as well as
the transboundary nature of most water resources, heightens competition for scare water
supplies. Three major problems have arisen from this competition over water resources: 4
" First, the distribution of water in the region creates water-rich and water-
poor states. Upstream states, from which rivers originate, can exercise
great control over the flow to downstream states that also depend on the
water. This control can have a destabilizing effect on relations between
neighboring countries. Control and allocation of water resources can
result in direct conflict between countries.
* Second, to alleviate the shortage of fresh water supplies, countries will
require access to advanced technologies to develop water resources or
locate new water sources.
" Third, countries are more" likely to engage in conflict over the control of
and allocation of water.
*Aharon Klieman also foretells the coming water crisis and its potential to
destabilize domestic regimes, strain interstate relations, and poison regional peace
prospects. In every Middle Eastern country, population growth, rising standards of
living, agricultural development, and industrial expansion all contribute to place strains
on water supplies.5 Water use will soon exceed water availability.
4 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 103.
5 Klieman.
6
Stephen Kiser similarly identifies a "confluence of variables," which affect each
other and serves to add complexity to any comprehensive water solution. 6
" Water scarcity is the single greatest cause of the water problem in the
Middle East.
" Rapid population growth creates a higher demand on an already scarce
resource.
" Rapid economic expansion, development, and urbanization place
additional pressures on scarce water resources.
* Technological advances make it easier to find and exploit water.
* Poor water management results in the depletion of internal sources of
water, such as groundwater, and the non-exploitation of external sources
of water, such as rain.
" Vague water laws whereby upstream riparians have sovereignty over
water while the water needs of downstream riparians are a secondary
consideration.
* Unequal distribution of water due to the transboundary nature of most
water supplies is a source of regional tension.
* Previously existing tensions between countries make cooperation on water
issues more unlikely given all the above-mentioned variables.
Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray identify five approaches to the water issue:
security, economic, legal, technical, and environmental. Their hypothesis is that water
plays a "multifunctional role" in all aspects of human life and interaction with the
6 Stephen D. Kiser, Water: The Hydraulic Parameter of Conflict in the Middle East and North
Africa, INSS Occasional Paper 35 (USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute of National Security Studies,
September 2000), 6.
7
environment. Water issues must be approached in the context of all of the approaches,
not just each one individually. 7
A. REGIONAL WATER SCARCITY
The World Bank paints a very bleak picture of water availability in the MENA
region in its 1996 report on water scarcity: 8
* Over seventy percent of the earth's surface is covered with water.
* Ninety-seven percent of all water is in the world's oceans as unusable salt
water.
0 Of the remaining three percent that is freshwater:
o Eighty-seven percent is locked in ice caps, glaciers, the
atmosphere, soil, or deep aquifers.
o Only about thirteen percent (0.4 percent of all water) is usable.
* Of that, less than one percent is in the Middle East and North Africa.
Ten countries in the MENA region already consume more than 100 percent of
their renewable water supplies.9 Libya's water use exceeds its annual renewable supply
by 400 percent. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq consume more water than can be withdrawn from
water supplies internal to the country. Egypt utilizes the Nile River for 95 percent of
water consumption, while the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers supply Syria and Iraq with 55
7 Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict or
Cooperation? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 15.
8 World Bank, 2.
9 Gerard Collins, Water (Problems in the Middle East) H (September 1997). Available [online]
http:/iwww.medea.be/enindex247.htm [8 March 2001].
8
and 57 percent of water consumption needs respectively.' 0 The Arabian Peninsula states
consume water at a rate greater than annually renewable water supply production.
Shortage of water is the root cause of the water problem in the Middle East. Low
rates of annual precipitation, population growth, domestic pollution, expanding initiatives
in agriculture and industry, and rising standards of living further weigh on the water
crisis. As stated previously, the MENA region contains less than one percent of the
worlds water resources, yet represents five percent of the world's total population. Per
capita water availability in the Middle East is the lowest in the world-representing only,
one-third of Asian levels and fifteen percent of African levels.11
B. IMPACT OF POPULATION GROWTH AND POLLUTION
The current rate Middle East population growth averages three percent annually, a
rate that is amongst the highest in the world. The total population of the MENA region is
already exceeds 423 million and will likely double by 2025.12 Water use increases with
the rise in population and the current population is already taxing existing water supplies.
Growing populations need more water not only for drinking and sanitation, but
also for agriculture and industry. The Islamic Network on Water Resources has
calculated that the minimum water requirement for each of the 21 Arab League states is
1,250 cubic meters per person per year-55 cubic meters for personal use and 1.150
10 Aquastat, Summary Tables of the Near East Region. Available online] http:/w-%v,% fao.ort
waicenttfaoinfo/agricultag~laglw/aquastat/tablesn2.htm [26 March 2001]. Table 6.
11 World Bank Group, 5. Illustration 1.
12 Ilan Berman and Paul Michael Wihbey, The New Water Politics of the Middle East, (1999).
Available [online] http://wwv.israeleconomv.or/strategic/water.htm [12 March 2001].
9
cubic meters for agriculture and industry. In 1985, more than half of the countries could
not meet this minimum water requirement. By 2025, only three of the countries are
likely to meet this requirement, based on population growth rates and current water
supplies. 13
A population that is growing by three percent annually will place severe strains on
sewage treatment capabilities and water supply availability. In an area where water
supplies are already critically scarce, domestic pollution of these supplies compounds the
problem of scarcity. Domestic pollution contributes to the deterioration of usable sources
of water and causes a decline in the quality of the water that is available. Over-depletion
and lack of controls on use of existing water resources makes pollution and
contamination of rivers, lakes, and groundwater more likely to occur. These degraded
conditions caused by water scarcity and population growth increase insecurity and make
conflict over water more likely to occur.
C. AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
In the Middle East, agriculture accounts for eighty to ninety-five percent of water
used-yet only represents an average of six percent of the region's gross domestic
product (GDP) and employs no more than twenty percent of the population. 14 While
cutting back on agricultural production seems to be the likeliest remedy, to the countries
concerned, food self-sufficiency is synonymous with independence. Reliance on
imported food is unlikely for Middle Eastern countries that have so recently gained their
independence from colonial powers.
13 Collins.
10
Industrial use of water will continue to increase and compete with the agricultural
sector for water. Industrial demand for water creates additional problems. While
industry contributes more to gross domestic product than agriculture, industrial
wastewater is more difficult to treat and can end up polluting rivers and aquifers.
Technology allows greater exploitation of water through the construction of
irrigation canals, dams, and deeper wells. This increases water supply capacity and
allows for the growth of populations, increased agricultural production, improved
sanitation, and improves other areas of life. However, technology can also lead to more
water problems. Irrigation canals waste water through inefficient watering, dams create
large reservoirs which lead to greater water loss through evaporation, and deeper wells
further reduce ground water reserves and can increase the salinity of the water supply. 15
Poorly planned farming and field irrigation is a primary cause of water waste.
Unregulated well drilling further exacerbates water misuse, increased salinity, or
saltwater intrusion of groundwater supplies. Poorly maintained pipes and other water
transportation systems waste additional water. Initiatives for the expansion of agriculture
and industry further impact negatively on water availability in the region. Growing




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
12
III. WATER CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
As water availability and overall quality declines, crisis zones are emerging along
the major rivers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. These evolving
conflicts are manifestations of water's growing role as a strategic and political force.
Ewan Anderson identified the Jordan, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Nile basins, as
having strategic and geopolitical importance to countries that rely on water from the
basins. 16
The crisis zones in the MENA region are:
" The Tigris and Euphrates River-Turkey, Syria, and Iraq
" The Jordan River-Israel and Jordan
" The Nile River-Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia
" The Arabian Peninsula-the Arab states of the Persian Gulf 17
• The Maghreb-Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya
A. EUPHRATES-TIGRIS BASIN
In the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey (figure 1) have invested in
dams for the generation of electricity and irrigation of agricultural lands. Turkey, as the
upstream state, has the capability to effectively control the amount of water flowing to
Iraq and Syria.' 8 Table 1 shows the population and growth rates of Iraq, Syria, and
Turkey. Figure 2 provides a more detailed depiction of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
16 Ewan Anderson, "Water: The Next Strategic Resource," in Joyce R. Starr and Daniel C. Stoll,
eds., The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 5-7.
17 Less Yemen.
18 Kemp and Harkavy, 102.
13
Turkey'.
Figure 1. Euphrates and Tigris Riparians. 19




Table 1. Population and Growth Rate of Euphrates-Tigris Riparians. 20
The Euphrates River is 1,700 miles long, originates in Turkey, and flows through
Syria to Iraq, where it merges with the Tigris River to become the Shatt-al-Arab River.
The river empties into the Persian Gulf. The Shatt-al-Arab estuary is a large marshland,
but is navigable for a distance of 450 miles and has many tributaries.
The Tigris River, 1,180 miles long, originates in Turkey and winds southeasterly
forming a portion of the northwestern border of Syria and Turkey. Like the Euphrates,
the Tigris is partially navigable and has many tributaries.
19 Source: Ilan Berman and Paul Wihbey.
20 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000. Available [online]
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicationsfactbook [Multiple access dates]. All population and growth rate data
supplied in this thesis were obtained from the Factbook.
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1. Iraq
The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, and the tributary rivers, do not actually drain
into the Persian Gulf, but rather supply the southern lakes, swamps, and marshes of Iraq
(figure 3) during the tidal cycle. Several dams and reservoirs store floodwaters, the
largest of which contains eighty thousand cubic meters, and serveS to generate
hydroelectric power. The Shatt-al-Arab drains the remainder of the water to the Persian
Gulf The average total surface water supplied annually is about 84 billion cubic
meters. 22
aSmar'a- I R A N
An N sajaf yanya ,
Figure 3. Iraq.2 3
Precipitation in the Zagros Mountains serves to supply water for rain-fed
agriculture, as does precipitation in the lower elevations. Irrgation is mainly by river
22 Christian E. Gischler, Water Resources in the Arab Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge:
Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1979), 100.
23 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
16
water in the Mesopotamian plain. In the southern areas of the country, salinity affects
fifty to eighty percent of irrigated lands. 24
2. Syria
In Syria (figure 4), precipitation is more plentiful in the coastal mountain ranges
decreasing eastward and in the lower elevations. In the eastern rangelands, growing
human and livestock populations have placed heavy pressure on groundwater supplies
through overgrazing and the extension of dry farming.
0 60 120 km
O 60 120 mi
TURKEY
Sea2
















Renewable groundwater capacity is 1.6 billion cubic meters and is accessed
through over 30,000 wells. The largest dam, Tabqa, has a capacity of almost twelve
24 Gischler, 99-100.
25 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
17
million cubic meters, while the total of all other smaller dams supplies only slightly more
than one million cubic meters.26
3. Turkey
Turkey (figure 5) controls the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. In
1983, Turkey initiated the $32 billion Southeast Anatolia Development Project, also
known as GAP (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi), a series of 22 irrigation and hydroelectric
dams, including the 554-foot high Ataturk Dam (figure 6), along both rivers.27 While the
project will supply 24 billion kilowatt-hours of energy and open over 1.5 million hectares
of land to irrigated cultivation, low levels of investment in the project could delay
completion of the project for fifty years. 28 The Southeast Anatolia project has raised
concerns in Iraq and Syria over availability of water for their own agricultural and
industrial use. At normal flow rates, the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers supply enough
water for the needs of all three countries. However drought, combined with the filling of
reservoirs, can lead to a lack of adequate water supply in the downstream countries.
Turkey, situated at the headwaters of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, can
execute extensive control over the flow of these rivers. The GAP project on the
Euphrates could escalate disputes over water with Iraq and Syria into regional conflicts.
Once completed, GAP may reduce Euphrates water to Syria by forty percent and to Iraq
26 Gischler, 114.
27 Nicole Pope, When the River Runs Dry?, 10 October 1999. Available [online]
http:i/www.nisnbc.con/newsi319925.asp [12 March 2001].
28 Starr, Water Wars.
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by up to eighty percent. 29 Turkey's large-scale consolidation efforts are becoming
increasingly threatening to Iraq and Syria.
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Figure 5. Turkey.30
Figure 6. Turkey's Ataturk Dar. 31
29 Berian and Wibbey.
30 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
31 Source: Nicole Pope.
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B. JORDAN BASIN
In the Jordan Basin, Israel and Jordan will face severe water shortages unless they
greatly increase their cooperation. Access to water is one of the key issues left
unresolved in the ongoing peace process. 32 Table 2 shows the population and growth
rates of Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank.
Country Population (in millions) Growth Rate (percentage)
Israel 5.8 1.67
Jordan 5 3.1
West Bank 2 3.38
Table 2. Population and Growth Rate of Jordan Riparians. 33
The Jordan River is two hundred miles long, originates in Lebanon and Syria, and
flows southward through the Sea of Galilee to the end of its course in the Dead Sea. The
current of the river is sufficient to support hydroelectric power stations. The water is also
used by Israel for the irrigation of agricultural crops in the Negev Desert. The river is
shallow and the level often drops during the dry seasons.
1. Israel
Israel's agricultural sector supplies five percent of the gross national product yet
utilizes over seventy percent of the country's water resources. Water use in Israel (figure
7) exceeds annual natural replenishment by fifteen to twenty percent with approximately
850 million cubic meters being consumed annually. 34 Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank
32 Kemp and Harkavy, 102.
33 Central Intelligence Agency.
34 Kiser, 10.
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face a combined deficit of at least 300 million cubic meters per year upwards to 600
million cubic meters per year. 35
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35 Starr, Water Wars.
36 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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2. Jordan
The Jordan River and its tributaries supply 850 thousand cubic meters annually
while groundwater supplies are 165 thousand cubic meters annually. 37 The Amman
Wadi Sir aquifer's water quality is threatened by pollution from household sewage runoff
and industrial waste. The aquifer can provide groundwater storage and recharge through
injection of storm runoff, treated sewage water, and any other available surplus water.
Jordan (figure 8) is experiencing an escalating water deficit that is expected to
reach 250 million cubic meters by 2010.38 Jordan desires to utilize water from the Qa
Disi aquifer, which is currently utilized almost exclusively by Saudi Arabia. The aquifer,
which lies beneath both countries, may emerge as an issue of conflict.
Figure 9 provides a more detailed depiction of the Jordan River basin.
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37 Gischler, 102.
38 Berman and Wihbey.
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Ten countries share the waters of the Nile River Basin, but the main disputes over
the water resource has so far involved only three countries, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan
(figure 10). Egypt faces the most obvious water crisis, and the situation becomes more
severe each year. Its population of 68.5 million is growing by an annual rate of 1.78
percent. Table 3 shows population and growth rates for Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
Egypt is almost completely dependent on the Nile's water and claims that prior usage
entitles it to a disproportionate share of the water resource; over ninety-five percent of
agricultural production comes from Nile-irrigated land. Egypt needs to expand its
agricultural land and reduce saltwater intrusion from the Mediterranean Sea to the Nile
delta. 41
Egypt is very concerned about its relationship with Ethiopia since roughly 85
percent of the Nile River's flow in Egypt originates with the Blue Nile. Egypt has
frequently warned Ethiopia not to take any steps that would affect the Blue Nile's
discharge. Ethiopia has responded on numerous occasions that it reserves sovereign right
to use the Blue Nile for the benefit of its own population. Ethiopia has broad plans to
develop fifty irrigation and hydroelectric generation projects. As Ethiopia claims a larger
share of the Nile headwaters, Egypt will likely experience a slight reduction in Nile water
flow.4 2
41 Christine Drake, "Water Resource Conflicts in the Middle East," The World and 1 15, no. 9
(September 2000). Available [Online]: htp:/iproquest.umi.comirpdqweb ProQuest Direct/Search: Middle
East Water [4 October 2000].
42 Ibid.
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Egypt is also apprehensive about Sudan. Incapable of expanding its water use at
the present, this situation could change in the future. With increased use of Nile waters
for agricultural irrigation, Sudan could become the breadbasket of the Middle East. The
Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 is one of the most important agreements between the two
countries allocating the Nile's waters. The Sudano-Egyptian Agreement of 1959 adjusted
the 1929 allocation, reducing Egypt's share. 4 3 Regional economic improvement will
require cooperative management of the Nile River and its tributaries. Egypt has
protection of its Nile water resources as one of its key strategic objectives. 44
Figure 10. Nile Riparians.45
43 Raj Krishna, "The Legal Regime of the Nile River Basin," in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in
the Middle East, eds., Joyce R. Starr and Daniel C. Stoll (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 27.
44 Kemp and Harkavy, 102.
45 Source: Ilan Berman and Paul Wihbey.
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Table 3. Population and Growth Rate of Nile Riparians. 46
At a length of 4,160 miles, the Nile is the longest river in the world. One of the
major sources of the river is Lake Victoria, which is bordered by Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda. From Lake Victoria, the Nile flows northward through Uganda, Sudan, and
Egypt before emptying into the Mediterranean Sea. From Lake Victoria, the river is
known as the Victoria Nile until it enters Lake Albert, after which it is known as the
Albert Nile. At the border of Sudan, the river becomes the Bahr al Jabal until it merges
with the Bahr al Ghazal to become the White Nile. At Khartoum, the White Nile joins
the Blue Nile. From here, the Nile courses towards its distributaries as it empties into the
Mediterranean Sea. Numerous dams have been built on the Nile River, the first one was
the Aswan Dam built in 1902. Aswan High Dam was completed upstream of its
predecessor in 1971. The new dam created Lake Nasser, one of the largest reservoirs in
the world. Other dams are the Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile and the Jabal Awliya Dam
on the White Nile, both in Sudan.
The Nile River supplies 55.5 million cubic meters of water-this accounts of 86
percent of the water used in Egypt annually. The Nile River's importance to Egypt is not
46 Central Intelligence Agency.
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The Nile River supplies 55.5 million cubic meters of water-this accounts of 86
percent of the water used in Egypt annually. The Nile River's importance to Egypt is not
in its water alone, but also the flow of the river's water. Twenty-eight percent of the
country's power is produced from hydroelectric plants on the river. Flood irrigation from
the Nile River supplies water for almost all of Egypt's food production. Already Egypt
imports fifty percent of its food requirements. Despite these factors, Egypt's water needs
will continue to increase. Egypt's population will shortly exceed seventy million,
increasing by more than one million per year. Egypt and Sudan are likely to face water
deficits within the next ten years. Both currently require about five billion cubic meters
per year.47
As stated above, the Nile is Egypt's primary source of water for meeting
consumption demand-Egypt's reliance on the river's water is absolute. Coupled with
the striking seasonal variation in river flow, Egypt suffers from insufficient water during
the long, dry summer months. The storage capacity of the Aswan High Dam is essential
for coping with periods of low flow levels. Settlement in the Nile basin is intimately
associated with the river. In Egypt, most of its population is crowded in a habitable,
thirty thousand square kilometer, narrow corridor of arable land along the Nile River and
in the Nile Delta.4 8 Moreover, Egypt is the furthest downstream state in the Nile River
Basin.
47 Starr, Water Wars.
48 Miriam R. Lowi, "Water and Conflict in the Middle East and South Asia: Are Environmental
Issues and Security Issues Linked?" in Journal of Environment and Development 8, no. 4 (December
1999). Available [Online] http:/ioroquest.umi.com/lpdpweb ProQuest Direct/Search: Middle East Water [4
October 2000].
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The Nile River is comprised of two major tributaries, the Blue Nile and the White
Nile. The two branches of the Nile merge at Khartoum, Sudan, to become the Nile River,
which continues its northward course to the Mediterranean Sea through Sudan and Egypt.
Fortunately for Egypt and Sudan, the states upstream have shown little interest in
exploiting the White Nile and other Nile tributaries. On the other hand, Egypt's position
downstream of Ethiopia, on the Blue Nile, is troublesome. The Blue Nile's flow
represents over eighty percent of the total discharge of the Nile River. Recently, because
of population growth and declining food security, Ethiopia needs to develop the waters of
the Blue Nile. 49
Miriam Lowi uses Egypt to highlight the variety of related features that illustrate
the degree to which water scarcity may be considered a national security concern. These
features are: the quantity and quality of the water resource relative to present future
demand; the nature of water dependency; and, in the case of transboundary rivers, the
number of riparian states involved, the nature of relations with the other riparians, and
finally, geographic position within the basin. For Egypt, arid climate, high population
growth, complete dependence on one transboundary body of water, in downstream
position, and the threat of important extractions upstream combine to create the
perception that water is a vital security concern. Harmful changes to the water resource
would threaten Egypt's welfare and would likely generate a hostile response. Egypt's
relative economic, military, and political power makes it unlikely that any of the other
states involved would take action to provoke a hostile response.
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Figure 11. Nile River Basin.50
50 Source: Masahiro Murakanii.
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The principal causes for concern in the Nile River Basin are environmental and
economic. Lack of written agreements between users of Nile water is largely a result of
Egypt's insistence on its overriding needs. 5 ' Rapid population growth in the states of the
Nile River Basin means that demand for water will increase. Existing water resources
will have to be used and allocated more efficiently to meet demand. Otherwise, the
consumption and development requirements of some states will not be met. The
combination of high population growth and a scare resource is not be sustainable and
may prove'to be highly unstable. Consequently, 25 years from now, when the population
has doubled and there is a lack of water resource cooperation, there could be conflict over
control of the waters of the Nile River Basin. S2
1. Egypt
The Nile River is the whole life of Egypt (figure 12). The country owes its
existence to the river, which provides water for agriculture, industry, and domestic use.
Nearly the whole population of Egypt resides along the Nile and cultivation is dependent
on irrigation from the river.5 3 Egypt relies on the Nile River for 97 percent of its water
needs, despite 95 percent of the discharge originating from upstream states. The Blue
Nile, with headwaters in Ethiopia, accounts for 85 percent of the Nile's discharge.
Egypt's water use exceeds annual renewable resources within the country.5 4
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Figure 12. Egypt.55
Egypt uses its annual allocation of 55.5 million cubic meters of water from the
Nile, and an additional six million cubic meters of Sudan's allocation, due to Sudan's
inability to use its full allocation. Groundwater resources are sizeable: 300 million cubic
meters in the Nile Delta and 200 million cubic meters in the Nile Valley aquifer.
Unfortunately, the groundwater supplies are not economically recoverable and have to be
managed closely to prevent a decline in the water table and saltwater intrusion. These
two water sources are being used at half the annual renewable rate. Eighty percent of
Egypt's water use is for the irrigation of agriculture where water loss is significant due to
inefficient water delivery systems.
The Aswan High Dam, completed in 1971, gives Egypt a large measure of control
over its national water supply. However, high evaporation rates due to the location and
55 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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climate reduce the efficiency of the dam. Additionally, the hydroelectric production of
the dam only accounts for twenty-two percent of total electrical production in Egypt.
Egypt's land reclamation projects, both in the Nile Delta and Valley, and between
the delta and the Suez Canal, and in the Sinai, is considered a priority. Only thirty
percent of the lands reclaimed become economically productive. Agricultural expansion
is largely a response to the country's growing food deficit. Large portions of Egypt's
bulk food needs are met by imports despite an increase in domestic food production.
Self-sufficiency is exhibited in fruits and vegetables, and Egypt is able to export a
portion. While the results of land reclamation and agricultural expansion are
questionable, they are clearly a national interest.5 6
2. Ethiopia
Ethiopia's (figure 13) water supply situation is quite favorable relative to its
neighbors, Egypt and Sudan. Total surface water supply is 112.6 million cubic meters, of
which 55 million cubic meters can be exploited. There are fourteen river basins with a
flow rate of over 100 million cubic meters annually across Ethiopia's borders. The
problem for Ethiopia is poor distribution of an abundant water resource. One-third of
Ethiopia is prone to drought while 540,000 hectares of land is prone to flooding.
Limited irrigation projects have been undertaken as Ethiopia lacks a
comprehensive water and agriculture management program. Hydroelectric production is
an area of great potential, however the ideal sites for dams are a large distance from
56 Beschomer, 47-52.
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centers of consumption. Water projects will be a cause of concern for Egypt and
Sudan.5 7
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Sudan (figure 14) is allocated 18.5 million cubic meters of Nile water annually by
agreement with Egypt, but only uses 12.5 million cubic meters. Over eighty percent of
allocated water is used for irrigation of agriculture. The few dams that have been built
store eight million cubic meters and satisfy most of Sudan's electricity needs.
Sudan has been developing irrigated agriculture since the 1970's in its plan to
become the "breadbasket" of the Middle East. The agricultural schemes have largely
failed but great potential still exists provided large investments in infrastructure and
proper management are made available. The agriculture sector employs over sixty
57 Beschorner, 55-56.
58 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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percent of the population, and accounts for almost forty percent of gross domestic
product and 95 percent of exports. However, drought and population displacement have
caused widespread food shortages. Misdistribution has also been a factor. Sudan's
economic and political situation jeopardizes irrigation development plans.5 9
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D. MAGHREB
Not addressed in the literature to the extent of the other areas reviewed above,
North Africa is rapidly urbanizing and the population is growing just as quickly. Water
resources are quickly becoming strained from overuse and contamination, while erosion
and desertification compound the problems of scarcity. Table 4 shows population and
growth rates for Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.
59 Beschorner, 52-54.
60 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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Table 4. Population and Growth Rate of the Maghreb States. 61
1. Algeria
Algeria's population growth rate, despite ranking amongst the lowest of all
African states, is still high enough to pressure development. Fresh water supplies are
scarce, but per capita consumption is low. The majority of urban and rural populations
have access to unpolluted water. A high priority has been placed on soil conservation as
a protection against erosion. Algeria (figure 15) receives precipitation on its coastal
zone, high plateaus, and mountain ranges.
The average consumption of renewable groundwater from the northern slope of
the Atlas Saharien range exceeds fifty percent with the heaviest usage of groundwater
occurring around Algiers, where consumption exceeds eighty percent. Consumption of
renewable groundwater from the southern slopes of the Atlas Saharien is at a rate of three
million cubic meters per year, three times the annual rate of renewal, however annually
renewable groundwater reserves are estimated to be about sixty billion cubic meters.62
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2. Libya
Libya (figure 16) likely has taken the most interesting and unique approach to
water scarcity. There are no permanent streams or rivers in Libya. A network of dams
has been built to store runoff from the infrequent rains, and wells have been drilled in
many settlements to access underground aquifers. Libya has undertaken a number of
irrigation projects to relieve the water shortage, the most interesting of which is the
"Great Man-Made River" (figure 17), a vast water pipeline.
In August 1991, Moammar Qaddafi ceremoniously turned a valve that
commenced the $25 billion project to bring water from aquifers in the southern desert to
63 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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the populations of northern Libya.64 The project plans, first laid out in 1979, could take
25 years to complete, but will eventually tap numerous aquifers and transport fresh water
to Libyan cities and agricultural areas along the Mediterranean coast. The first phase of
the project transports two million cubic meters of water annually through a 1,200-
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Figure 16. Libya.66
64 Gary Gardner, "From Oasis to Mirage: The Aquifers that Won't Replenish" in World Watch 8,
no. 3 (May 1995). Available [online] http://proguest.umi.corr/pdqweb Search: "water" and "Saudi Arabia"
[28 March 2001].
65 Collins.
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Figure 17. The Great Man-made River Project.67
67 Source: Masahiro Murakami.
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3. Morocco
Morocco (figure 18) uses more than ninety percent of its freshwater supply for
agricultural production. Available freshwater for human consumption is limited by
pollution from sewage and industrial waste. Periodic droughts contribute to shortages in
some areas of the country, and the problem of water scarcity is expected to worsen as
Morocco's population continues to grow. Morocco has made serious efforts at water
resource allocation and sanitation improvement, but faces a water supply that will decline
as the population grows. Storage reservoirs to catch discharged floodwater from rains
have a total capacity of over seven million cubic meters.68 Renewable groundwater
capacity is almost ten million cubic meters, however less the five million cubic meters is
usable due to quality problems.
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68 Gischler, 106-107.
69 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
39
4. Tunisia
Water scarcity and regular drought are problems for Tunisia (figurel9). Tunisia
suffers from erosion and desertification. Runoff of untreated sewage is a large
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Figure 19. Tunisia. 70
70 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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Groundwater production is very low, only 1.8 million cubic meters annually.
Attempts at catching rain runoff have been largely unsuccessful due to evaporation and
silting. Desert encroachment is one of the biggest problems faced by Tunisia. One
hundred thousand square kilometers of land is subject to rangeland management through
reforestation and sand dune control. 71
71 Gischler, 115.
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IV. THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
On the Arabian Peninsula (figure 20), water issues expose the vulnerability of the
Persian Gulf states. For example, Saudi Arabia requires the operation of twenty-three
desalination plants located along its coasts in order to meet half of its fresh water
needs. 7 2 Gulf states must use petroleum byproducts from oil drilling to distill water
while nearby states (Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey) allow water to flow freely into the ocean.
The Arabian Peninsula is an immense, sparsely inhabited desert. Various
minerals are produced, including gold, silver, sulfur, and salt, and there are enormous
reserves of natural gas and petroleum. However, no permanent streams exist and rainfall
is less the seven inches per year. Low rainfall and lack of reliable surface water makes
water the most valuable resource on the Peninsula. Desalination has become the primary
means of supplying water.
The Persian Gulf countries account for sixty percent of the world's desalination
capabilities; Saudi Arabia alone accounts for thirty percent of global production.73 The
smaller Gulf States are almost completely dependent upon desalination for their water
needs.. Desalination plants, expensive to maintain and a critical source of water, can
become targets for military or terrorist aggression. During the Iran-Iraq War, both sides
targeted dams, desalination plants, and water-conveyance systems. 74  Water is
fundamental to survival on the Arabian Peninsula. Of the ten Middle East and North
72 Kemp and Harkavy, 102.
73 Starr, Water Wars.
7 4 Kemp and Harkavy, 101.
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Africa (MENA) states that already consume over 100 percent of renewable water
supplies seven are on the Arabian Peninsula-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. 75
Table 5 shows population and growth rates for the Arabian Peninsula states.
Figure 20. Arabian Peninsula.76





Saudi Arabia 22 3.28
United Arab Emirates 2.4 1.61
Table 5. Populations and Growth Rate of Arabian Peninsula States .77
75 Collins.
76 Source: MSNBC News
77 Central Intelligence Agency.
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A. BAHRAIN
Bahrain (figure 21) depends almost entirely on deep aquifers and desalinated
water since there is no surface water. Annually renewable groundwater supply is two
hundred million cubic meters. 78 Bahrain's Damman aquifer, which lies under the central
portion of the island, has become contaminated by seawater intrusion over the last forty
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Figure 21. Bahrain. 80
B. KUWAIT
Deep aquifers supply only thirteen million cubic meters of water; there is no
permanent surface water. 81 Before 1950, Kuwait (figure 22) imporied water from the
78 Gischler, 97.
79 Murakami, 103-104.
80 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
81 Gischler, 102-103.
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Shatt-al-Arab by dhow to supplement well water. Kuwait was the first state in the
Arabian Peninsula to utilize seawater desalination in conjunction with electrical
generation and is one of the first countries to utilize treated sewage effluent for
agricultural purposes. 82  With limited groundwater sources for future exploitation,
Kuwait will continue to rely on desalinated water to meet its water needs.
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Figure 22. Kuwait. 83
C. OMAN
Oman (figure 23) has no permanent lakes or rivers, however falaj (man-made
channels from underground water sources in the mountains) and springs provide a source
of water. The available surface water from the falaj is about ten million cubic meters
82 Murakami, 114. In addition, treated sewage reused amounted to 97 million cubic meters as of
1988.
83 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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Qatar (figure 24) has extensive groundwater reserves that are recharged by storm
water runoff, however this supply is being slowly depleted. The northern aquifer has an
estimated reserve capacity of 2.5 billion cubic meters. When added to the numerous
depressions and drainage catchments, the total increases to three times that amount.
Based on usage figures, the northern aquifer will continue to supply water until around
2010. Desalinated water production first began in 1955 and now provides for most of
84 Gischler, 107-108.
85 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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domestic and industrial water use. Recharge of aquifers using desalinated water has been
proposed as well as use of treated sewage water for recharge or irrigation of agriculture. 86
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Figure 24. Qatar. 87
86 Gischler, 108-110.
87 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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E. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
In the United Arab Emirates (figure25) water used for agricultural purposes is ten
times that used for domestic and industrial purposes. Ground water supplies amount to
270 million cubic meters annually with surface waters of 160 to 270 million cubic meters
available during the year. 88
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Figure 25. United Arab Emirates. 89
88 Giscbler, 116.
89 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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V. SAUDI ARABIA
Water in Saudi Arabia (figure 26), like oil, is hidden. With little rainfall and high
daytime temperatures, water does not exist on the surface for very long. Saudi Arabia's
water is found underground. Aquifers provide 88 percent of the country's water,
including ninety percent of agricultural irrigation and fifty percent of urban water needs.
Agriculture employs 5.5 percent of the labor force and accounts for 8.8 percent of GDP,
having risen slightly in the 1990's as petroleum revenues declined. 90 Water use is
estimated to increase fifty percent by 2010.91
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Figure 26. Saudi Arabia.92
90 Aquastat, Saudi Arabia, (March 1997). Available [online] http:i/www.fao.org/waicentfaoinfoi
agricult!agl/aglw/aquastatisauarab.htm [29 March 2001].
91 Gardner.
92 Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
51
The Saudi water situation:
* Surface water exists only briefly after infrequent, heavy rains, and
riverbeds remain dry most of the year.
" Over 200 dams have been built or planned with a total capacity of about
500 million cubic meters.93
* Largest producer of desalinated water in the world.
" Twenty-seven sewage treatment plants are in operation and half of treated
sewage wastewater is reused. 94
" Groundwater aquifers are estimated to run dry in 25 years. 95
* Ninety percent of the non-renewable deep-well water is utilized for
agricultural purposes. 96
Desalinated water is often used only for municipal purposes, as it is too saline
despite treatment. Treated wastewater is used for irrigation of non-edible crops,
landscape irrigation, and industrial cooling. Otherwise, most water used comes from
non-renewable aquifer sources and the quality of this water is likely to deteriorate. 97
Saudi Arabia faces numerous factors-non-renewable water resources, rising
consumption, falling supplies, and non-sustainable agriculture-which conspire to strip
the country of its future water resources. Saudi wheat production (figure 27) is one area
93 Aquastat, Saudi Arabia.
94 Ibid.
95 Collins.
96 Berman and Wihbey.
97 Aquastat, Saudi Arabia. In 1988, there were 4,667 government wells and 44,080 private wells
for multi purpose use. Deterioration in water quality (increased salinity) of some ground water sources
results in treatment before being put to municipal use. Coastal areas suffer from seawater infusion.
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where much water is wasted. Between 1980 and 1994, 34 billion cubic meters of water
was used to produce seventeen million tons of wheat that was exported.98 The water
used represents seven percent of Saudi Arabia's water reserves or 21 years of non-
agricultural water consumption. 99 Water delivered to the wheat fields for as little as ten
cents per cubic meter cost as much as $1.10 to supply.
Saudi exploitation of the Eastern Province's aquifer reduces water available to
Bahrain and Qatar. Disputes have occurred between Saudi Arabia and Jordan over the
Qa Disi aquifer. The political tension can produce future conflict over water resources on
the Arabian Peninsula-a regional conflict that may engulf Saudi Arabia and its




Figure 27. Saudi Wheat Field. 100
98 Ibid. In 1992, wheat production was almost 4.1 million tons. National demand for wheat was
only 1.2 million tons. Other agricultural exports include vegetables and fruit.
99 Gardner.
100 Source: Saudi Embassy
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A. SAUDI WATER PROJECTS
Water is an important concern for Saudi Arabia; so much that water in considered
a national treasure. Numerous hydrologic studies have been conducted in the pursuit of
optimal and prudent use of groundwater resources. Water planning and management is
an ongoing effort particularly in areas where wells have been the primary means of
supplying water. Maintaining groundwater supplies through regulation and conservation,
as well as setting limits to development, are part of this effort. The Saudi Ministry of
Agriculture and Water is conducting various water projects. The goal is to create a
comprehensive national water plan. Figure 29 depicts a reservoir project.
Figure 29. Saudi Water Resevoir.1 02
The largest water development projects include: potable water supply projects, the
Riyadh Water Project, comprehensive regional water projects, water projects in other
major cities and villages, water towers, and sewage water reuse projects. The water
102 Source: Saudi Embassy.
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projects are also geared towards the creation of an integrated agricultural development
plan. These projects include wells, pumping stations, pipelines and piping networks,
collection tanks, and dams for the collection of flood waters for drinking, irrigation, and
recharge of groundwater resources. 103
Potable Water Supply Projects. Water supply projects for cities and rural
villages and settlements are prioritized for execution. These projects are
mostly well water systems. This project also includes the provision of
water by tankers to areas waiting for development.
* Riyadh Water Project. A multi-phased development project was necessary
due to the rapid urban development and population growth of the area.
Development and treatment of groundwater supplies amounts to the
production of over 1.5 million cubic meters per day by numerous
desalination plants. The Riyadh Water Project includes the water supply
projects in Salboukh, Al Buwaib, Al Wasi, and Jubail. The Jubail project,
on the Persian Gulf coast, contributes half of the total water to Riyadh.
Water is supplied to Riyadh by extensive networks of wells, pumping
stations, pipelines, storage tanks and reservoirs, and treatment plants.
" Regional Water Projects. These projects provide water to large cities or to
a number of settlements in a wider area. Water supplies are developed and
existing systems are upgraded. These projects aim to decrease the number
of wells and reservoirs needed to supply water in a given area, as well as
reduce the number of treatment plants required. The thirteen largest
projects supply water to over 150 cities, towns, and villages.
" Water Towers. Four water tower projects have been completed and serve
as water network pressure compensating tanks. The towers are located in
Buraida, Jeddah, Kharj (the tallest at 103 meters tall), and Riyadh (figure
30). The capacity of these towers range from 7,800 to 13,500 cubic
meters. Some towers also contain restaurants and vantage points to attract
visitors.
* Sewage Water Reuse Project. The purpose of this program is to reduce
consumption of groundwater supplies. The treated sewage water is
supplied for agricultural and industrial use.
103 Ministry of Agriculture and Water, Water Projects. Available [online]
http://www.agrvat.Luov.sa/minsectors/sectorse/watr000 I.htm [28 March 2001].
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Figure 30. Riyadh Water Tower. 104
104 Source: Ulf Bagge.
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VI. WATER SCHEMES
Per capita water resources per capita are declining rapidly. Current average
annual per capita net water resources in the Middle East and North Africa is about 1,400
cubic meters per person, and this is likely to decline to 700 cubic meters per person by
2025.105
A. DESALINATION
Desalination is currently the most heavily used method to supply water, especially
in the Arab Peninsula. Appendix B shows the world states with the highest desalination
capacities. With desalination, freshwater can be produced from brackish water, seawater,
or recycled sewage water. Desalination is cheaper than engaging in water disputes or
conflict over inadequate water resources, *and is cheaper that attempting to divert water
over great distances.
Tom Everett-Heath identified 51 desalination projects scheduled for completion
between 1999 and 2005. The countries involved are Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The projects range
from small plants producing only 500 cubic meters per day to massive plants the size of
small cities, such as the Jubail III in Saudi Arabia (figure 31), producing over 725,000
cubic meters per day. Building costs range from $1.47 million to over $1 billion. 106
105 Amikam Nachmani, A Commodity in Scarcity: The Politics of Water in the Middle East (1
March 1994). Available [online] htp://www.jcpa.org/il/hit02.htm [8 March 2001].
106 Tom Everett-Heath, "Private Progress," in Middle East Economic Development (28 January
2000), 12.
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Most of the world's desalination capability (figure 32) resides in the Middle East,
particularly along the Persian Gulf and Red Sea coasts. Roughly sixty percent of the
world's desalination capacity resides there and many plants serve a dual purpose as
power facilities. 10 7
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Figure 32. Ten States with the Largest Desalination Capacity.' 09
107 Joyce Shira Starr, Covenant over Middle Eastern Waters: Key to World Survival, (New York:




Malaysia and Turkey have proposed two plans for using converted tankers or
large towed containers to ship water to the Middle East. Potential buyers are
apprehension with these methods due to the ability of other countries to stop water
shipments.
1. The Malaysian Plan
The plan proposed by Malaysia involves using a fleet of tankers to annually
supply over 39 million tons of water to the Arabian Peninsula at a cost of $600
million.1 10 The cost of this water is very expensive at about $6 per cubic foot. This plan
is similar to a 1970s agreement between the Gulf States and the Philippines to transport
oil from the Persian Gulf to the Philippines in return for water shipped back in the same
tankers.1 11
2. The Turkish Plan
The plan proposed by Turkey involves shipping water in converted oil tankers or
by towing large plastic bags from the Manavgat River to Israel. Through this scheme,
150 million cubic meters of water could be extracted annually-it is estimated that this
water would cost about fifty cents per cubic meter, about half the cost of desalinated
109 Pacific Institute, The World's Water (6 May 2000). Available [online] www.worldwater.orp/
waterdata.htm [29 March 2001]. Figure 1.8 Desalination Capacity. Data as of January 1, 1996. Captions
removed by author.
110 Collins.
II1 Amon Soffer, Rivers of Fire: The Conflict over Water in the Middle East (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 242.
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water.112 Turkey is already using this method to export water to the Turkish enclave in
Northern Cyprus.11 3 This $125 million project involves pumps that send river water to a
treatment facility and then along a pipeline to two sea terminals from which tankers can




Figure 33. Manavgat River. 115
C. CANALS
Canal systems that would supply water to desalination plants and electricity
generation plants have been proposed. Two proposals to ease the shrinking waters of the
Dead Sea include the Red-Dead Sea Canal and the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal. 116
All canal schemes involve the use of canals and tunnels, pumping stations, and power
112 Collins.
113 Pope.
114 Scott Peterson, Turkey's Plan for Mideast Peace, (18 April 2000). Available [online]
http://www.csmonitor.cor.n durable/2000.04/18ip 1 s L.htm [8 March 2001].
115 Source: Scott Peterson.
116 Nachrani.
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generation facilities. Each of these projects could cost upwards to $4 billion to build.
Figure 9 above, shows locations of facilities and proposed canal routes.
" The Red-Dead Plan. Proposed by Jordan in 1981, this plan would pump water
from Aqaba, north to Mount Edom, 2,000 feet above the level of the Dead Sea.
Over ten billion cubic meters of water per year would rush down to the Dead Sea
creating lakes and rivers. The water could drive hydroelectric stations, which in
turn would power desalination plants. 117
" The Med-Dead Plan. First proposed by Israel in 1980, there are two plan variants:
a canal through Gaza to the Dead Sea (southern route) and a canal from Atlit
(northern route) that would eventually empty into the northern end of the Dead
Sea.118
Given the nature and history of conflict in the Levant fact and each country has its
own proposal; it is unlikely that either country will cooperate with the other in building a
multi-national water conveyance system.
D. PEACE PIPELINE
In 1986, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal proposed the water "Peace Pipeline," which
could supply Turkish water to the Persian Gulf and Levant countries. As proposed, the
plan would take water from Turkey's Ceyhan and Seyhan Rivers (figure 34), which
empty into the Mediterranean Sea at a rate of 39 million cubic meters per day, 119 and
transport it southward through two massive pipelines. One pipeline would travel through
Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, supplying water to those states; the other pipeline would
supply the Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
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Figure 34. Ceyhan and Seyhan Rivers of Turkey.1 20
Construction of this massive pipeline project would take eight to fifteen years and
cost upwards to $22 billion to build.1 2 1 The "Western" pipeline to the Levant would be
over 2,700 kilometers long, cost about $8.5 billion to build, and supply 3.5 million cubic
meters per day to Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The "Gulf' pipeline to the Arabian
Peninsula would be over 3,800 kilometers longs, cost about $11 billion to build, and
supply 2.5 million cubic meters per day to Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf
states. 122 Table 6 shows the distribution capacity of the pipelines. Together, the length
of both pipelines and branches would exceed 6,500 kilometers and supply six million
120 Source: The Perry-Casteneda Library Map Collection, the University of Texas at Austin.
Modified by author.
121 Gawdat Bahgat, "Stability in the Persian Gulf: The Water Dimension," in International
Journal of World Peace 16, no. 1 (March 1999), 51-64. Available [online] http:/,proquest.umi.com'
pdcqweb Search: "water" and "Middle East" [4 October 2000].
122 Kemp and Harkavy, 337.
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cubic meters of water daily, about 2.2 billion cubic meters annually 123 while only using
















Table 6. Distributions of Pipelines. 125
Funding the Peace Pipeline would require a joint water-sharing agreement
between countries using the pipeline. Saudi and Kuwaiti officials did not accept the
proposal for political reasons and because desalinated water is cheaper than pipeline
123 Soffer, 239.
124 Collins.
125 Cem Duna, "Turkey's Peace Pipeline," in The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East
eds., Joyce R. Starr and Daniel C. Stoll (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 123-124. Modified from Table
7.1 and 7.2. Similar tables are available in Soffer's Rivers of Fire, 239, and Dolatyar and Gray's Water
Politics in the Middle East, 197.
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water. Further, a role will be given to Turkey that allows that country to exercise
sovereignty and control of waters supplied to the Gulf countries. Arabs would have to
rely on Turks for water, and Kuwait would have to rely on water coming from Iraq. A
water pipeline that passes through several countries is also vulnerable to attack in a time
of conflict. Figure 35 depicts the layout of the various pipelines.
Whatever happens politically in the future, Turkey continues to have a surplus of
freshwater while the countries of the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula face an increasing
water deficit. 126  Meanwhile, Turkey's total unused flow of river water to the
Mediterranean Sea amounts to sixteen billion cubic meters per year. Jordan and Israel
consume 3.2 billion cubic meters of water per year while sources are only renewed at 2.5
billion cubic meters per year. 127 The Arabian Peninsula states will continue to build their
own desalination plants and water projects while they consume more water and
population growth continues.
On the other hand, Joyce Starr points out that Turkey is not the water savior of the
Middle East. 128 Turkey does not have an unlimited supply of water. Turkey's present
demand for water exceeds fifty percent of exploitable annually renewable water supplies.
Growing populations, urbanization, GAP, and agricultural promotion will only serve to
place further demands on available water.
126 Kemp and Harkavy, 337.
127 Peterson.
128 Starr, Covenant over Middle Eastern Waters, 129.
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E. COMAPRISON OF SCHEMES
Combining national water systems is the least likely method to resolve the
worsening water crisis in the Middle East. Economics and politics form barriers to
cooperation in water resource management and allocation. Diversion of water from other
countries or reduction in agricultural production is undesirable due to the vulnerability
that dependence and lack of self-sufficiency entail. Table 7 shows a comparison of the
amount of water supplied and the per unit cost of the various water schemes.
Amount of Water Supplied
Water Delivery Scheme (Million cubic meters per year) $ Cost per Cubic Meter
Desalination 50 0.68
Med-Dead Canal 800 0.42
Red-Dead Canal 850 Data not supplied
Used Tankers 200 0.83
New Water Tankers 200 1.12
Large Vinyl Bags 200 0.55
Ceyhan-Seyhan Rivers 200 1.48 avg.
Table 7. Capacity and Cost of Various Water Delivery Schemes. 130
F. FOR THE FUTURE: VIRTUAL WATER
States facing water scarcity must direct their efforts on two levels.
" First, continued improvement in the efficiency of production and
allocation of water supplies is essential.
* Second, with the conception of "virtual water," it is necessary for states to
investigate the extent to which they can sustain food production for their
population. 1 31
130 Everett-Heath, 10. Data is mostly relevant to the Levant. Desalination costs have been
reduced as low as $0.55 per cubic meter. Red-Dead Canal costs were not provided in table but are likely to
be about the same cost as the Med-Dead scheme.
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J. Anthony Allan defines virtual water as "water required to provide the essential
food imports needed by an economy."' 132 Virtual water can have a direct impact on water
supply in countries such as Saudi Arabia, which utilize excessive amounts of water in
agricultural production. For example, it requires one thousand tons or one thousand
cubic meters of water to produce one ton of grain. A person needs the equivalent of one
ton of grain per year. One ton of grain is easier to transport than one thousand cubic
meters of water. Therefore, one means by which water deficient countries balance their
water budgets is to import food. This virtual water, plus water supplies already present,
allows the country meet its water needs.
Efficiency in water allocation and management lead to the effective use of small
amounts of water to produce goods and services which are in turn exchanged for those
that require large amounts of water to produce. However, most countries would rather be
somewhat self-sufficient in food production than depend on imports. As populations
grow and urbanization increases throughout the region, the strains on inadequate water
resources are growing fast. 133
131 J. Anthony Allan, Water Security Policies and Global Systems for Water-Scarce Regions,
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Expanding urbanization, rising birthrates, and aggressive agricultural initiatives
are quickly depleting water resources across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
and greatly affects the geopolitical makeup of the region. Turkey's proposed "Peace
Pipeline" to carry water from the Ceyhan and Seyhan River to the Arabian Peninsula
failed to progress beyond the planning stage due to regional fears of dependence. Other
regional water initiatives, importing water by sea or interstate water allocation, have
failed for similar reasons based on discontinuous politics and historical suspicion of
neighboring states.
Given the "confluence of variables" that makes a comprehensive water solution
so complex, water is likely to play an increasingly larger role in MENA geopolitics.
Water-planning issues will likely go hand-in-hand with issues of regional security and
stability. The creation of security frameworks is necessary in order to normalize regional
tensions over water and foster safety and stability.
Ilan Berman and Paul Wihbey outline numerous steps that countries in the region
can take, regionally and domestically, towards creating a structure that will facilitate
coherent regional coordination: 134
* Resolve outstanding disputes over water. Resolution of current water
disputes is the first step towards the creation of a regional political alliance
over water issues.
• Integrate water into regional strategic cooperation. Integration of water as
an element of coordination in the strategic alliances taking shape in the
region further moves the region towards strategic water security.
134 Berman and Wihbey.
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* Modernize current systems of water distribution and processing. The
repair of old and damaged water distribution systems and the increase of
the efficiency and capacity of existing systems will reduce water waste
and raise the amount of water available.
* Consolidate strategic control over current water efforts. Water has
strategic value in the Middle East region and countries reliant on
vulnerable, expensive desalination plants will have to invest in security.
These plants make countries more self-reliant and increase the potential
for conflict.
* Implement progressive domestic water initiatives. Success in domestic
water initiatives to reduce water usage makes successful water alliances
more likely. Regional efforts in research and development should be
considered a national security priority.
Through conservation, more benefits can be obtained from each unit of water
consumed. Treatment and reuse of wastewater for irrigation or municipal use is one
method that has been explored. This treated water can also be used to recharge aquifers.
Better delivery and efficient use of water in agricultural irrigation will conserve water
through minimizing waste and evaporation. Drip irrigation delivered directly to the roots
of crops in another method that is in use.
Steps must be taken to reduce and eliminate pollution of water resources. Sewage
treatment plants and national water standards are one means. Another is reduction of
pollution from sources such as industrial waste and agricultural pesticides that seep into
groundwater supplies or washed into rivers.
Sources of freshwater in the Middle East are scarce to begin with and already
heavily stressed by over consumption. Desalination of seawater is currently the most
used method for supplying large quantities of water. Desalination plants are expensive
and require large amounts of energy to produce water. Both of these factors make
desalination an unlikely method for capital-poor, developing, or agriculture-intensive
72
states, however desalination is probably the most promising answer to the Middle Eastern
water crisis. Water scarcity will remain the most likely source of future conflict and
cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
In 1988, Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll predicted, "By the year 2000, water-not
oil-will be the dominant resource issue in the Middle East." 135  From the material
presented, it is easy to confirm that this is the case today.
Water issues are firmly on the political agenda throughout the region and
their significance will grow as the strain on inadequate supplies, and
inefficient management and distribution systems, increasingly affect other
areas. 136
135 Joyce Starr and Daniel C. Stoll, eds., The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 143.
136 Everett-Heath, 9.
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United Arab Emirates 0.2
Table 8. Renewable Freshwater Supply by Country. 137
137 Pacific Institute. Table 1 Total Renewable Freshwater Supply by Country. Modified by





















United Arab Emirates 2.11
Table 9. Freshwater Withdrawal by Country. 138
138 Pacific Institute. Table 2 Freshwater Withdrawal by Country and Sector. Modified by author.
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APPENDIX B: DESALINATION CAPACITY
Country Total Capacity (cubic meters/day)
Saudi Arabia 5,006,194
















Table 10. Desalination Capacity by Country. 139
139 Pacific Institute. Table 16 Desalination Capacity by Country, January 1, 1996. Table modified
by author. Desalination capacity of less than 500 cubic meters per day not included.
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